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TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES’ ABILITY TO 
SUSTAIN SUCCESS AMID GROWING REGULATORY CONCERNS 






Imagine you are in a new city, or are enjoying a night out on the 
town. It is late, and you need to find a way home. As you walk out onto 
the street, what do you see? I would guess you see an empty street, with 
maybe a car or two passing by as you stand there idly. As you try to figure 
out how to get home, you must first consider your options. There is always 
public transit, such as the bus or subway. But for some, especially after a 
night of drinking, walking several blocks to the nearest bus stop or subway 
station is not the safest option. Another option is a taxicab. Although you 
may not see any waiting outside the bar, you can always call a dispatcher 
and have one sent to you. But that could take who knows how long. And, 
                                                 
*
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if you have just walked out of a bar that is now closed, your only option is 
to wait for the taxi outside. 
Another option is getting a “transportation network company” to 
pick you up. While you are still in the bar, you can just slip out your 
smartphone, send your address, and by the time you walk outside, your 
ride is waiting for you. You also have the added security that your ride 
will actually show up because you can watch it progress toward your pick-
up spot in real time. And you know that this is your ride as opposed to 
another bar-goer’s ride because you were given your driver’s name and 
license plate ahead of time. This seems like the most obvious choice when 
you consider the disadvantages offered by the other options. There is 
speed, convenience, and a security that your ride will come when it says it 
will. Plus, if you are a frequent user of this transportation method, you 
likely did not even have to take out money because you have a credit card 
stored in your phone that automatically paid the travel fare. 
These new on-demand transportation services, often referred to as 
Transportation Network Companies (“TNCs”), have greatly altered the 
2





 Today, there are several companies that utilize 
this on-demand transportation throughout the United States and globally. 
Transportation experts refer to the services offered by TNCs as 
“ridesourcing,”2 a concept that should be distinguished from the term 
“ridesharing.”3 Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), a multinational 
organization that operates a mobile phone software application (“app”) 
used to connect passengers to drivers,
4
 is the largest and so far the most 
successful of the on-demand transportation companies.
5
 Uber’s main 
competitor and the next largest on-demand transportation service, Lyft, 




Companies like Uber and Lyft have irreparably disrupted the 
taxicab industry, but as the law catches up with these new TNCs, the 
                                                 
1
 Lisa Rayle, et al., App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services: Comparing Taxi and 
Ridesourcing Trips and User Characteristics in San Francisco, UNIV. OF CAL. 





 Id. “Ridesharing” occurs when the driver and rider are going to the same or nearby 




 Jennifer J. Kunz, Transportation Network Companies (e.g. Uber, Lyft, etc.), BEST BEST 
& KRIEGER, https://www.bbklaw.com/getmedia/e82420f3-cc71-4da2-b131-
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companies will have to take into consideration the extensive legal fees 
required in order to either fight or reshape transportation regulations. This 
is most evident for Uber, the largest TNC, which is currently facing more 
litigation than any other startup in the world.
7
  
Uber has a launch first, deal with logistics later approach.
8
 Uber 
generally enters a new city and then confronts the regulatory concerns 
after it has established a presence in that city.
9
 Once consumers form a 
reliance on the services that Uber offers, it is harder for local governments 
to exert leverage against Uber.
10
 This model generally works for Uber; 
however, when it is unsuccessful, Uber faces high regulatory barriers that 
usually lead to costly settlements.
11
 
Although Uber is one of the most successful businesses of its time, 
it faces numerous challenges to its sustainability over the long run because 
                                                 
7
 Kristen Brown, Uber is Facing a Staggering Number of Lawsuits, FUSION (Jan. 25, 








 This is most apparent in Uber and Lyft’s campaign to change an Austin, Texas 
ordinance, where it is estimated the companies spent $8.6 million on the campaign. Nolan 
Hicks & Ben Wear, Prop. 1 goes down as Activist Proclaims: ‘Austin made Uber an 
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of the great number of lawsuits it is involved in. Much of Uber’s future 
will be left to the courts, which is generally not where regulation should be 
decided. This is because Uber is a national firm, but different judges may 
apply different laws depending upon the jurisdiction in which the suit was 
brought. This would lead to inconsistent rules and a mess for anyone 
hoping to hop on the TNC bandwagon. 
Uber in many respects eliminates the need for the regulations that 
have plagued the traditional taxicab industry for the past several decades. 
However, there are certain aspects of Uber, and all TNCs, that need to be 
determined by a regulatory body in order for TNCs to continue their 
growth.
12
 Although Uber, as well as other TNCs, faces great costs due to 
litigation over a wide range of issues, Uber will be able to sustain its 
growth while also funding its litigation expenses because of the lasting 
effect Uber has had on the market. 
This paper will first examine the pricing strategies of TNCs and 
how their entrance into the market has affected the taxicab industry. This 
                                                 
12
 Specifically, there needs to be a decision regarding the status of TNC drivers. Whether 
they are classified as employees or independent contractors will determine much of the 
current litigation against Uber. 
5
Parato: Transportation Network Companies'
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
287 
paper will then discuss Uber specifically to determine whether the larger 
litigation costs will impede Uber’s ability to continue growing over time. 
II. WHAT ARE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES? 
A Transportation Network Company (“TNC”) uses smartphone 
apps to connect potential passengers to drivers who offer rides in their 
own personal vehicles.
13
 In 2013, the California Public Utilities 
Commission defined a TNC as an organization “that provides prearranged 
transportation services for compensation using an online-enabled 
application (app) or platform to connect passengers with drivers using 
their personal vehicles.”14 
Uber, originally founded as UberCab in March of 2009,
15
 was the 
first of its kind, offering a respite from the frustration of trying to find a 
                                                 
13
 Rayle, supra note 1, at 2. 
14
 Commissioner Peavey, Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public 
Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry, CAL. PUBL. UTIL. 
COMM’N, 3 (Sept. 19, 2013),  
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K112/77112285.PDF. 
15
 Nathan McAlone, Here’s how Uber got its start and grew to become the most valuable 
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cab during peak travel hours or dealing with the expense of a car service.
16
 
The service was priced between a typical cab fare and a car service fee,
17
 
but the main attraction was the better quality service and higher end 
vehicles used for transportation.
18
 This original service is the equivalent to 
today’s UberBLACK.19 By 2010, UberCab went live for the first time in 
the San Francisco Bay Area
20
 and changed its name to just “Uber.”21 
Shortly after, Uber began its national expansion and later began expanding 
on an international scale in 2011.
22
 
When it launched in San Francisco in 2010,
23
 Uber originally 
offered only one service, UberBLACK.
24
 But Uber has since expanded its 
offered services to include other transportation classifications at varied 
                                                 
16
 Leena Rao, UberCab Takes the Hassle Out of Booking A Car Service, TECHCRUNCH 







 Id. UberBLACK is discussed infra Part IV. 
20




 Avery Hartmans & Nathan McAlone, The Story of how Travis Kalanick Built Uber 
into the most Feared and Valuable Startup in the World, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 1, 
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prices as well as services beyond transportation, such as food delivery.
25
 It 
also currently offers ride-sharing services in San Francisco.
26
  
Uber has subsequently added more services.
27
 In late 2012, Uber 
announced UberX, a cheaper alternative to UberBLACK that allows 
drivers to use their own vehicles.
28
 By 2014, Uber began testing a new 
courier service called UberRUSH in Manhattan,
29
 and it added 
UberPOOL, a service available only in a few cities.
30
 
Uber has been the subject of several lawsuits from drivers, taxi 
companies, and governments on a global scale. Currently, Uber is 




                                                 
25
 See Eric Auchard, Uber Launches Global Assault on Takeaway Meals Market, 
REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2016, 7:22 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-food-delivery-
idUSKCN11W2LX; Joshua Brustein, Uber Expands Into Courier Service With 




 UberPOOL San Francisco: Everybody’s In!, UBER NEWSROOM (Sept. 2, 2014), 
 https://newsroom.uber.com/us-california/uberpool-san-francisco-everybodys-in/. 
27





 Brustein, supra note 25.  
30
 See UBER, Ride with Uber, https://www.uber.com/ride/ (last visited June 19, 2017); 
Jenn Harris, Uber Launches $3 Food Delivery Service UberFresh, LOS ANGELES TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 2014, 12:44 PM), http://www.latimes.com/food/dailydish/la-dd-uber-launches-
food-delivery-service-uberfresh-20141208-story.html. 
31
 Brown, supra note 7. 
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III. THE TAXICAB INDUSTRY PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF TNC’S 
The taxicab industry has historically been a monopoly with 
extremely high barriers to entry due to the need for medallions, essentially 
a license to own a taxi, in order to operate a taxi. Ridesourcing services, 
such as the on-demand transportation services offered by companies like 
Uber and Lyft, have become a subset of the taxicab and limousine 
industry.
32
 With industry revenue anticipated to grow to $18.9 billion by 
2016,
33
 the taxicab industry is an appealing marketplace for ridesourcing 
firms that are able to gain entry. With that, however, taxicab operators are 
incentivized to delay disruption to the market. 
The taxicab industry is highly regulated by local governments 
restricting entry into the markets, fares, and services.
34
 The taxicab 
industry is so highly regulated because there is a need for the regulation. 
Proponents of taxicab regulation argue that the market imperfections may 
create market failures or lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in 
                                                 
32
 Brian Sayler, Taxi & Limousine Services in the US, IBISWORLD (Jan. 2017), 
http://clients1.ibisworld.com/reports/us/industry/default.aspx?entid=1951. 
33
 Brian Sayler, Industry at a Glance, IBISWORLD (Jan. 2017), 
http://clients1.ibisworld.com/reports/us/industry/ataglance.aspx?entid=1951. 
34
 Mark W. Frankena & Paul A. Pautler, An Economic Analysis of Taxicab Regulation, 1 
(F.T.C. 1984). 
9
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 Aspects of the taxi industry that contribute to the 
efficiency, or lack thereof, of the market include wait-time, cost, and 
consumer welfare.
36
 The potential inefficient resource allocations include 
“over- or under-production of various taxicab services, production of 
service at too low a quality level, or unnecessarily high costs of producing 
a given output.”37 There are several areas of regulation to protect against 
these market failures such as price controls, restrictions on entry, and 
regulations on quality, “which concern vehicle safety, driver 
qualifications, and liability insurance coverage.”38 
Price controls are likely the most conspicuous of taxicab industry 
regulations because they affect both consumers and drivers. There are 
situations in which price regulation may be necessary in an unregulated 
market because of inefficiently high fares.
39
 However, fare regulation in 
                                                 
35
 Id. at 1-6. Market failures are the inefficient allocation of resources. Id. A market 
outcome is considered efficient only when there is no conceivable change in the 
allocation of resources that would make one individual better off without harming 
another individual. LYNNE PEPALL, ET AL., , INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 28 (Wiley 5th 
ed. 2014). Thus, if there is some way in which to improve the position of one individual 
without taking from another, then the market is not efficient. Id. 
36
 Sean McBride, Ridesourcing and the Taxi Marketplace (May 2015) (unpublished 
Senior Honors Economic Thesis) (on file with Boston College University Libraries). 
37




 Id. at 3. The first situation is cruising taxis or taxis waiting at airports; the cab fare 
would be inefficiently high because of the high transaction costs to consumers of finding 
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itself may pose as a market imperfection because, depending on the type 




The justifications for restrictions on entry are based on the idea 
that if fare rates are set inefficiently high for the service offered, then an 
inefficiently large number of drivers will enter the market.
41
 However, this 
is only true if fares are too high—in which case, the argument would 
support deregulation of taxi fares rather than entry regulations.
42
 
Legislators created restrictions on entry by use of medallions. A medallion 
is essentially a license to operate a taxi;
43
 there are only so many 
medallions available in the city and few are issued each year.
44
 In 2013, 
                                                                                                                         
the cheapest taxi. Id. The second situation is cruising taxi drivers, who could potentially 
charge higher rates to consumers who are unable to find another taxi. Id. The third 
situation is where taxi firms could charge higher fares for radio-dispatch and contracted 
cabs because of the taxi firms’ benefits from economies of scale. Id. Economies of scale 
occur “[w]hen average cost falls as output increases, it means that the cost per unit of 
output declines as the scale of operations rises.” Pepall, supra note 35, at 69. Economies 
of scale can pose as a barrier to entry to smaller firms, thus enabling the established taxi 
farms to take advantage and charge higher fares. Frankena, supra note 34, at 3. 
40
 Frankena, supra note 34, at 4. 
41
 Id. at  41. 
42
 Id. at 4. Entry restrictions are also argued to increase efficiency because taxis cause 
congestion and pollution. Id. This argument was rejected by Frankena and Pautler based 
on the evidence of congestion and pollution externalities from taxicabs. Id. at 5. 
43
 Id. at 26. 
44
 ANNA BARLETT & YESIM YILMAZ, TAXICAB MEDALLIONS - A REVIEW OF 
EXPERIENCES IN OTHER CITIES, 1 (2011).  
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A third market failure in the taxicab industry that regulations 
attempt to fix is information asymmetry.
46
 Information asymmetry 
supports regulations on quality.
47
 Regulations on the quality of service 
regard “vehicle design, condition, age, and safety, driver qualifications, 
and liability insurance coverage.”48 Before actually getting into the 
taxicab, the rider cannot determine the quality he or she is about to 
receive.
49
 It is not until the rider has already made the choice to get into 
the cab that he or she could decide if the cab is clean, the vehicle is safe, 
                                                 
45
 MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & DAVID YASSKY, 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, 12(New York 
City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n 2014). 
46
 Information asymmetry occurs when the parties to a transaction have different levels of 
information. THOMAS LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE, 168, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS 
(Forthcoming 2017) (on file with author). A result of information asymmetry is under-
production of goods or services that consumers want, called the “lemons problem.” Id. at 
169. Essentially, when consumers are unsure of the quality they are going to receive from 
a good or service, they will only pay the average of the lowest potential value of the good 
or service and the highest potential value—because there is a 50% chance they will get a 
good deal, and a 50% chance they will be overpaying. Id. at 168-169. If consumers are 
only paying the average, then high-quality producers are not going to sell on the market 
because their good is being under-valued. Id. Then, without those high-quality products, 
consumers will lower the amount they are willing to pay, because the average price of 
that good has now gone down, which then results in the slightly-above-average producers 
pulling out. Id. This cycle repeats itself until there are only low-quality producers left in 
the market. Id. 
47
 Frankena, supra note 34, at 4. 
48
 Id. at 27-28. 
49
 Id. at 4. 
12
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or even if the driver is qualified.
50
 Further, the rider has no way of 
knowing whether the driver has liability insurance.
51
 Riders would 




Without minimum standards for service quality, drivers who would 
otherwise offer high-quality services will cease offering such services 
because riders, who do not know which drivers offer high or low quality 
service, will only want to pay the up to the value for average services.
53
  
This pushes drivers offering the highest quality out of the market, 
either by leaving the market altogether,
54
 or by lowering their quality of 
service to match what they would be paid. If there are minimum fare 
regulations in place, then drivers will only offer service quality to match 
that fare minimum—there is no incentive for those drivers to offer high-
quality services.  
However, considering minimum fare regulations, some consumers 
may simply choose not to utilize a taxicab if they are concerned that the 
                                                 
50
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minimum fare value is above the expected quality of the taxi. Therefore, in 




Economic analysts have determined that restricting entry by use of 
medallions and creating fare minimums is a waste of resources and 
imposes burdens on consumers.
56
 However, regulations concerning 
vehicle safety, insurance coverage, and requirements that fares must be 




Some government agencies that create taxi regulations may not 
promulgate regulations to correct overall market failures.
58
 Rather, the 
regulations are in place generally to protect taxi firm incumbents and 
public transportation systems.
59
 The medallion system is an example of a 
regulation that, in reality, does little more than give incumbent firms 
greater market power.
60
 Up until the 1970s,
61
 the taxicab industry has seen 
                                                 
55
 Frankena, supra note 34, at 57. 
56
 Id. at 1. 
57
 Id. at 37-38. 
58
 Id. at 6. 
59
 Id. at 6-7. 
60
 Id. at 7. 
61
 SCHALLER CONSULTING, THE NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB FACT BOOK, 25 (2006). 
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little change since the creation of the medallion system in the 1930s prior 
to the introduction of TNCs.
62
 By restricting the supply of taxicabs in the 
market, the medallion system has created barriers to entry that are nearly 
impossible to overcome. 
The structure of the taxicab industry changed drastically when 
medallion owners started leasing medallions to drivers.
63
 The medallion 
owners provided the vehicle and insurance, as well as marketing, and the 
leasing driver paid a flat fee to the medallion owner.
64
 Drivers could lease 
a taxicab on a daily or weekly basis, and shifts lasted 12 hours.
65
 This new 
system effectively shifted drivers from employees of the medallion 
holders to independent contractors.
66
 The ability to lease their medallions 
allowed owners “to drop employee benefits which drivers had previously 
enjoyed, including health and pension benefits, employer contributions to 
                                                                                                                         
Medallion owners began leasing their medallions to drivers. Id. 
62
 BLOOMBERG & YASSKY, supra note 45, at 12. New York City responded to over-
supply of taxicabs by passing the Haas Act in 1937 which established the medallion 
system still used today. Id. 
63
 McBride, supra note 36. 
64
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Social Security, scholarships, legal services, unemployment insurance and 
disability insurance.”67 
Taxicab drivers also saw a drop in income due to the leasing of 
medallions.
68
 With the current leasing schemes, drivers are paid after 
accounting for vehicle costs and the leasing fee, rather than commission.
69
 
As of 2005, 57 cents for every dollar generated by fares and tips went to 
drivers, 24 cents went to vehicle maintenance, 4 cents went to other 
expenses, and 15 cents went to medallion owners.
70
 
IV. HOW DID TNCS CHANGE THE MARKETPLACE? 
The entry by TNCs has changed the market place—many would 
argue for the better. TNCs offer a similar but still different service than 
taxicabs; the biggest difference from the two is that TNCs operate via a 
smartphone app. Proponents of TNCs argue that they serve previously 
unmet demands for faster and convenient transportation.
71
 In a 2014 
survey, consumers said they chose TNCs over other transportation 
                                                 
67
 SCHALLER CONSULTING, supra note 61, at 27. 
68




 Id. at 35. 
71
 Rayle, supra note 1, at 1. 
16
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services like taxicabs and public transit mostly because of convenience.
72
 
35% of respondents said they chose a TNC for the ease of payment, and 
30% said short wait time.
73
 Notably, only 2% said that they chose a TNC 
because they could not get a taxicab.
74
 This indicates that consumers are 
often going straight to their preferred TNC’s app rather than using a TNC 
as only an alternative to taxicabs. 
As the data suggests, TNCs have filled a large gap in the 
marketplace because they are reaching consumers that prefer aspects such 
as speed and convenience that taxicabs simply cannot offer. It is in this 
way that TNCs are sustainable innovators;
75
 they are giving consumers 
something that they want, but the new technology is better than the old 
technology.
76
 The strategies of companies like Uber are sustainable 
because they have taken an already existing service and simply made it 
better in ways that respond to the flaws of the old system.
77
 There are 
several market failures within the taxicab industry that TNCs directly 
                                                 
72
 Id. at 14-15. 
73




 Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the 
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 1995). 
76
 Id.  
77
 Clayton M. Christensen, et. al, What is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 
2015). 
17
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 such as information asymmetry, but there are also several 
negative effects TNCs have had on various stakeholders.
79
 
The smartphone apps create better exchanges of information 
between drivers and riders by instantaneously pairing available and near-
by drivers to riders in need.
80
 The immediate connection between drivers 
and riders fixes the problems consumers face when trying to hail a cab or 
when calling a dispatcher.
81
 
Notably, Uber has obviated the need for regulations concerning 
information asymmetry and the inefficiencies created therefrom by 
utilizing a ranking system.
82
 Riders are able to provide anonymous 
feedback and rate drivers on a five-star system that future riders are able to 
see.
83
 Then, when riders request a ride via the smartphone app, in addition 
to the driver’s name and photo, they can see how many stars the driver has 
been given by other riders.
84
 Riders are given most of the information they 
                                                 
78
 Rayle, supra note 1, at 3. 
79
 Katie Biber Chen, Disruption: Innovation vs. Incumbents, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 
(Oct. 26, 2016). 
80








Id. Riders can also see the driver’s car make and model, and their license plate, as well 
as how much the trip will cost and how long it will take. Id. 
18
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need to make an informed decision about whether to use Uber—they 
know the likely quality of service their driver will give them, and how 
much the ride will cost. These are two aspects of information-related 
market failures regulations are meant to protect, but they are not necessary 
under Uber’s current system. 
TNCs are also better able to fix many market failures of the taxicab 
industry by offering different transportation options and dynamic pricing. 
For example, Uber offers two classes of ride services, economy and 
premium, which allow users to pick the type of car they will ride in, 
economy or luxury, based on the price they are willing to pay for the 
ride.
85




The Premium Ubers are UberBLACK, UberSUV, and UberLUX. 
Premium Ubers still utilize the basic on-demand transportation system that 




 Id. The Economy Ubers are UberX, UberXL, and UberSELECT. Id. As Uber’s  single 
purchaser transportation service, UberX allows drivers to drive up to four passengers in 
their own vehicles. Id. UberXL is essentially the same concept as UberX, but in a larger 
vehicle. Id. UberXL drivers drive vans or SUVs to allow for more passengers. Id. 
UberSELECT is the most expensive of the Economy Ubers because it only offers highly-
rated drivers that also drive upscale sedans. Id. 
19
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Uber is known for, but do so in high-end vehicles.
87
 This ultimately leads 
to a premium paid for by the passenger.
88
 
Uber has many other services available in select cities, such as 
Uber Access and UberPOOL.
89
 Uber Access offers rides in handicap 
accessible vehicles in certain cities.
90
 UberPOOL, an on-demand ride-
sharing service, is Uber’s lowest priced service offered.91 This service 
allows passengers to share their UberX ride and split the fare with other 
Uber users who are going along the same route.
92
 
In addition to personal transportation, Uber provides delivery 
services: UberEATS and UberRUSH.
93
 These services share the same 




 Id. UberBLACK, the first service offered by Uber, is the lower end of the Premium 
Ubers. UBER, What is UberBLACK?, https://www.uber.com/ride/uberblack/ (last visited 
June 19, 2017). Like the similarity between UberX and UberXL, UberSUV offers the 
same experience as UberBLACK, but with a higher capacity. See UBER, What is 
UberSUV?, https://www.uber.com/ride/ubersuv/ (last visited June 19, 2017). The most 
expensive of all the Uber options is UberLUX which offers professional direvers in 
luxury vehicles, such as a Porsche or a Range rover. UBER, What is UberLUX? 
https://www.uber.com/ride/uberlux/ (last visited June 19, 2017). 
89




 UBER, Share your ride and save with uberPOOL, https://www.uber.com/ride/uberpool/ 




 UBER, Deliver With Uber, https://www.uber.com/drive/delivery/ (last visited June 19, 
2017). 
20
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concept as Uber’s transportation services, except that instead of 
passengers these services deliver food and packages.
94
 
These services allow Uber to appeal to a larger consumer base and 
capture market share in other industries. Thus, more consumers are able to 
utilize their service which benefits both the consumers and drivers who are 
earning an income from these different services. 
TNCs also offer different prices depending on the current demand, 
called “surges.”95 Surge pricing is simply an upcharge, or increased fare, 
that is calculated as a multiple of the standard fee associated with Uber’s 
services conditioned on real-time demand.
96
 Surge pricing is based off the 
                                                 
94
 Id. UberEATS delivers food and UberRUSH delivers packages for businesses. UBER 
DEVELOPERS, Introduction to Deliveries, 
https://developer.uber.com/docs/deliveries/introduction (last visited June 19, 2017). In 
certain cities, Uber has set up a network of local restaurants that it delivers food from. 
UBER, What is UberEATS?, https://help.uber.com/h/d0a9d8d7-8066-42d7-a266-
4e6367158294 (last visited June 19, 2017). A user can either order an Uber to pick up 
and deliver food from one of those restaurants or select from a “Instant Delivery” menu 
to get food delivered in a shorter time period. Id. UberRUSH is an on-demand delivery 
system that works very similar to the regular Uber services. UBER DEVELOPERS, 
Introduction to Deliveries, https://developer.uber.com/docs/deliveries/introduction (last 
visited June 19, 2017). Businesses can order an Uber, hand off the package to be 
delivered, and then track the package as it is being delivered by the UberRUSH driver. Id. 
95
 McBride, supra note 36, at 48. 
96
 UBER, What is Surge?, https://help.uber.com/h/e9375d5e-917b-4bc5-8142-
23b89a440eec (last visited June 19, 2017). 
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rider’s location, not the driver’s.97 When demand is especially high during 
peak transportation hours, riders will see a price increase when they 
attempt to summon a TNC.
98
 Ultimately, surge pricing reduces the overall 
demand for rides and, as a result, increases the availability of drivers for 
those willing to pay a higher rate.
99
 The surge pricing also incentivizes 
drivers who otherwise would not be working without an increase in pay.
100
 
Therefore, the surge pricing system, which is temporary and lasts only 
until demand is back to a normal level, helps ensure that both supply and 
demand will remain at consistent levels.
101
 
There are also potential negative externalities posed by the entry of 
TNCs into the marketplace. As TNCs enter the marketplace, local 
governments are slowly reacting to their presence. Some cities have 
outright banned companies such as Uber, whereas others have set up 
regulatory schemes that make it infeasible for TNCs to operate under their 








 McBride, supra note 36, at 48. 
101
 UBER, supra note 98.  
22





 These concerns are discussed in the following 
section. 
V. HOW TNCS DEAL WITH REGULATION 
TNCs are under regulatory pressure to either comply with current 
regulations imposed on the taxicab industry, or to cease operations.
103
 All 
TNCs face similar legal concerns, but Uber has faced more opposition 
than any other TNC.
104
 
Uber is the only on-demand transportation service that has 
ventured outside the United States,
105
 and has expanded into more cities 
than any other company within the U.S.
106
 Uber is generally very 
successful when expanding to new cities.
107
 As of November 2016, Uber 
                                                 
102
 See Ilene Aleshire, City’s Regulations Drive Uber out of town — for now, THE 
REGISTER-GUARD (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://projects.registerguard.com/rg/news/local/32941203-75/uber-pulls-out-of-eugene-
after-hearings-official-finds-it-in-violation-of-city-codes.html.csp; see Andy Jechow & 
Kylie McGivern, Prop 1 Fails, Marking Defeat for Uber and Lyft in Austin, KXAN  
(May 7, 2016, 9:03 PM), http://kxan.com/2016/05/07/prop-1-fails-marking-defeat-for-
uber-and-lyft-in-austin/. 
103
 Rayle, supra note 1, at 4. 
104
 Brown, supra note 7. 
105
 Natasha Stokes, Uber vs. Via, Lyft & Sidecar: Who's the Best Car Service?, 





  See generally id.  
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operated in 242 cities in the U.S. and 522 cities across the world.
108
 The 
startup giant has enough resources to be able to penetrate into nearly any 
market with ease and deal with the aftermath as it comes. Nonetheless, 
regulatory and legal concerns, such as passenger safety and local 
transportation laws, have made it difficult for Uber to operate.
109
 In these 
situations, Uber tends to fight rather than give in to the demands of its 
opponents.
110
 This creates tension in areas where Uber is not immediately 
met with great reception, such as what occurred in Portland, Oregon; and 
Austin, Texas, both discussed below. 
A. Problems TNCs Have Faced During Expansion in the U.S. 
Uber has participated in legal and regulatory battles throughout the 
United States over claims in various legal areas, ranging from price fixing 
claims to flaws in its marketing scheme to employment law disputes.
111
 
Lyft, Uber’s greatest ride-hailing rival, was only sued a fraction of the 
                                                 
108
UBER, Uber Cities Across the Globe, https://www.uber.com/cities/ (last visited June 
19, 2017). 
109
 Kristen Brown, Here’s What’s Going on with all of Those Uber Lawsuits, FUSION 





 See infra Section A. 
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amount Uber has been sued.
112
 A significant amount of the lawsuits 




In 2014, when TNCs began launching in several cities throughout 
the U.S., local governments did not always react positively.
114
 Seattle 
passed a city ordinance to limit the number of ridesourcing vehicles, 
whereas Philadelphia, New York City and Washington D.C. issued 
citations and impounded vehicles.
115
 The Taxi and Limousine 
Commission in New York City also issued a temporary restraining order 
against Lyft which prevented its initial launch.
116
 St. Louis, Missouri 
issued a temporary restraining order in 2014 as well.
117
 
Uber and its competitor Lyft have seen great difficulty in their 
endeavors to expand services specifically to Austin, Texas, due to local 
regulations.
118
 Shortly after Uber entered the Austin market, Austin passed 
                                                 
112
 Brown, supra note 7. 
113
 See infra Section A. 
114








 See Alicia Inns, et. al, Rideshare Drivers will have to Undergo Fingerprint Checks, 




Parato: Transportation Network Companies'
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
307 
a new law that required drivers for companies like Uber to be 
fingerprinted in addition to the background checks undergone when 
hired.
119
 In 2015, Austin Mayor Steve Adler announced that TNCs would 
have until February 2017 to have their drivers fingerprinted in order to 
comply with a city ordinance that requires fingerprinting as a part of 
background checks.
120
 Supporters of the law argued that fingerprinting 
would make services like Uber safer for passengers, whereas the 




In May of 2016, Austin voters rejected Proposition 1, a plan to ban 
mandatory fingerprinting for two years.
122
 As a result of the election, both 
Uber and Lyft left Austin immediately.
123
 This left a gap in the supply for 
                                                                                                                         
companies/. Uber has also had trouble establishing itself in Portland, Oregon. See 
Aleshire, supra note 102. Uber left the city when city officials imposed a $1,500 a day 
penalty for non-compliance with local ordinances. Id. 
119




 See generally id. 
122
 Phil Prazan & Kate Weidaw, Fingerprints for Uber, Lyft Drivers in the Hands of 
Voters, KXAN (Feb. 11, 2016, 8:10 PM), http://kxan.com/2016/02/11/crunch-time-for-a-
city-council-decision-on-rideshare/. This effectively forced Uber to either comply by 
having all 10,000 of its drivers fingerprinted or to cease operations in Austin. See Jechow 
& McGivern, supra note 102. 
123
 Joshua Brustein, Austin’s Mayor Is Keeping Ridesharing Weird, BLOOMBERG 
TECHNOLOGY (June 6, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-austin-
ridesharing/. 
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on-demand transportation that consumers had grown accustomed to, 
which was readily filled by several different platforms.
124
 Thus, with the 
departure of Uber and Lyft came services such as Arcade City, the 




Arcade City is essentially a very large Facebook group that allows 
passengers in need of a ride to directly connect with drivers.
126
 With over 
30,000 members, Arcade City is the biggest forum of its kind, where 
members post in the Facebook group asking for or offering rides.
127
 As it 
is, Arcade City is not the most efficient platform to connect passengers 
with drivers. Because the group allows anyone to respond to passengers 
requests, a driver may call dibs on a passenger but be inconveniently far 
away, to the detriment of the passenger.
128
 The founder of Arcade City, 
Christopher David, believes that Arcade City will not have to comply with 
the mandatory fingerprinting that ultimately drove Uber and Lyft out of 
Austin because Arcade City is merely a platform for drivers and 










 See generally id. 
27
Parato: Transportation Network Companies'
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
309 
passengers to find one another as opposed to companies like Uber that are 
regulated by the city. However, David intends to create an app similar in 
concept to Uber and Lyft, rendering any distinguishable difference 
between Arcade City and Uber moot.
129
 
On the other end of the spectrum of entities rushing to fill the gap 
left behind by Uber and Lyft is RideAustin.
130
 RideAustin is a nonprofit 




In contrast to Uber’s legal confrontation in Austin, Uber saw mild 
success when it settled a lawsuit for $10 million in 2016 that was filed by 
Los Angeles and San Francisco.
132
 The suit alleged that by suggesting that 
its background checks on drivers were more intensive than those of 
taxicab companies, Uber was misleading consumers.
133
 The main 
contention was that taxicab drivers are fingerprinted whereas Uber drivers 








 Alex Hern, Uber's 'safe ride fee' Becomes 'Booking fee' After $25m Settlement over 











 Uber also changed its “Safe Rides Fee” to a “Booking Fee” in 
order to lessen the potential for consumer reliance on the safety of its 
rides.
135
 Earlier that year, Uber settled a similar lawsuit brought by 
consumers for $28.5 million.
136
 California also sued Lyft for similar 
reasons,
137




What seems to be the most important legal issue for Uber right 
now, in addition to its regulatory battles, is whether its drivers are 
employees or independent contractors. This issue alone will determine the 
outcomes of several lawsuits against Uber.
139
 The employee-independent 
contractor issue has arisen in several suits by Uber drivers claiming that 
they are in fact employees of Uber and thus should be reimbursed for 










 Ellen Huet, SF, LA District Attorneys Sue Uber, Settle With Lyft Over ‘Misleading’ 




 See Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (explaining that 
courts need a determination of whether Uber’s drivers are employees or independent 
contractors in order to determine if Uber has not complied with Texas state laws 
regarding notification of mass layoffs, for example; see federal employment violation 
case). 
29
Parato: Transportation Network Companies'
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
311 




The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines an employee as “a 
person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who 
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is 
subject to the other's control or right to control.”141 The pertinent factors in 
determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor are: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the 
master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) 
whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with 
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually 
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist 
without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular 
occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman 
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work 
for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for 
which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, 
whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the 
work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) 
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the 
relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal 
is or is not in business.
142
 
                                                 
140
 See infra Section A. 
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Most recently, the district court denied a preliminary approval of 
the proposed $100 million settlement between Uber and its drivers.
143
 In 
O’Connor v. Uber, the court denied the preliminary approval of the 
proposed settlement because the settlement was not “fair, adequate, and 
reasonable.”144 The court determined that a close review of the settlement 
agreement, even at the preliminary approval stage, was warranted because 
new claims and uncertified drivers would be covered by the settlement 
agreements, and the settlement agreement would effectively settle several 
claims in other pending lawsuits.
145
 Applicable approval factors that the 
court must balance include:  
“[T]he strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, 
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of 
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount 
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the 
stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the 
presence of a government participant; and the reaction of the class 
members to the proposed settlement.”146  
 
                                                 
143
 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *5, *19 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016). 
144
 Id. at *18. 
145
 Id. at *8. 
146
 Id. at *7. 
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The court then noted that an important factor in determining 
whether the proposed settlement is reasonable or not is the value of the 
settlement agreement compared to what the plaintiffs expect to recover.
147
 
This is an ongoing case. 
The employee-independent contractor dispute is pertinent in 
several other lawsuits.
148
 Drivers in Texas filed suits against Uber and Lyft 
alleging that these companies violated federal labor laws by not giving 
proper notice of their departure from Austin.
149
 This case ultimately 
depends on whether drivers for TNCs are classified as employees or 
independent contractors.
150
 Uber customers who were allegedly sexually 
assaulted by drivers filed suit against Uber for negligence, fraud, battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.
151
 In this case, the court said that in California, “an employer may 
be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the 




 Nolan Hicks, Lawsuits: Uber, Lyft Violated Labor law in Austin Shutdown, MY 






 Id. There would have been no violation of federal labor laws if the drivers are 
classified as independent contractors. Id. 
151
 Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
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scope of employment.”152 The issue was whether or not drivers were 
considered employees; the plaintiffs argued the drivers were employees 
and thus Uber was liable for their conduct.
153
 However, Uber claimed their 
drivers were instead independent contractors.
154
 
Uber is also facing legal action for its pricing strategies.
155
 In 
Meyer v. Kalanick, the Southern District of New York denied Uber’s 
motion to dismiss an antitrust class action against Travis Kalanick, CEO 
of Uber, alleging the CEO engaged in illegal price-fixing in violation of 
both federal antitrust law and New York state law.
156
 Plaintiff’s main 
allegations are that Kalanick “conspired with Uber drivers to use Uber's 
pricing algorithm to set the prices charged to Uber riders, thereby 
restricting price competition among drivers to the detriment of Uber 
riders.”157 This case essentially pertains to the validity of Uber’s price 
surging during times where demand is especially high.
158
 The court noted 
that the classification of an individual as an employee or independent 
                                                 
152






 Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016). 
156




 Id. at 821. 
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contractor depended on “whether the person to whom service is rendered 
has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result 
desired.”159 Additionally, the court stated that the § 220 Restatement 
(Second) of Agency factors were also relevant.
160
 Ultimately, the court 




B. Why TNCs Will Succeed Despite Regulatory Pushback 
The pertinent issue regarding TNCs is whether legislatures or the 
TNCs will shape regulations for TNCs. Currently, the law surrounding 
TNCs is being created in the courts, which is not the best way to set policy 
because of muddled decisions and variations by jurisdiction.
162
 Looking at 
the negative effects posed by TNCs will help form better policy.
163
 Thus, 




                                                 
159
 Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 781 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting S.G. 




 Id. at 782. 
162






The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/11
316 
Overall, drivers have both benefitted the most from TNCs and 
have been harmed the most. Prior to the addition of TNCs into the market, 
drivers’ only options were to lease medallions on a short term basis. Under 
this scheme, drivers were independent contractors; they received no 
benefits that an employee would as required by law. Drivers worked long 
shifts and only earned a fraction of every dollar received from fares.
165
 
With TNCs operating in cities that utilize medallion systems, drivers are 
able to drive for both. In particular, Uber allows drivers the flexibility to 
make their own work schedule. This allows taxicab drivers, or anyone for 
that matter, to offer rides through a TNC while they are not working in 
another capacity. Taxicab drivers are not granted this flexibility in 
scheduling unless the drivers split the lease among themselves. There are 
also costs to drivers as well.
166
 Drivers are still independent contractors, 
and thus still do not receive employee benefits.
167
 
Consumers also benefit from the entry of TNCs. In a survey of 40 
economic experts, all 40 either strongly agreed or agreed with the 
                                                 
165
 SCHALLER CONSULTING, supra note 60, at 27. 
166
 Tim Worstall, The Economics Of Uber: Who Loses From The Company's Existence?, 
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statement that “letting car services such as Uber or Lyft compete with taxi 
firms on equal footing regarding genuine safety and insurance 
requirements, but without restriction on prices or routes, raises consumer 




Although those who benefit from TNCs benefit greatly, there are 
also losers involved. And to make good policy, policy makers should 
consider the losers and whether they need protection.
170
 Taxi medallion 
sales have collapsed in what some call the “Uber effect.”171 Not only is the 
number of sales declining, but the price of each medallion is as well.
172
 
TNCs have effectively destroyed the medallion system.
173
 Prior to the 
entry of TNCs, medallion owners could rent out their rights to operate a 
taxicab for $40,000 a year.
174
 The rents from the system went to the 
                                                 
168






 Biber Chen, supra note 79. 
171
 Worstall, supra note 166. 
172
 Id. In May of 2016, there were just three medallions sales, each bringing in $400,000 
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medallion owners; but with the advent of Uber and the like, medallion 




In the end, there are both winners and losers when it comes to 
stakeholders involved in TNCs. Overall, consumers seem to benefit the 
most. Drivers are both benefitted and harmed, depending on what the 
driver wants out of the TNC. For those desiring flexible scheduling, TNCs 
are a great option because TNC drivers can work in between other jobs to 
supplement their income. But for those looking for higher pay or 
employee benefits, TNCs show no benefits. 
The biggest losers are those holding taxi medallions. They no 
longer have their rent-extracting ability they enjoyed prior to the entry of 
TNCs. But, the question is: do consumers care? Consumers were harmed 
in the pre-TNCs medallion system, which was a highly regulated, 
essentially artificial monopoly where only a few gained almost all the 
profit from the industry. TNCs have given consumers what was lacking: 
speed, convenience, and easy payment methods, to name a few. From a 
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public policy standpoint, the medallion owners hardly seem like a group 
that needs regulatory protection. 
In addition to future regulations, TNCs, especially Uber, are facing 
current litigation on several fronts. This litigation will shape what 
becomes the rules TNCs will have to follow.  Litigation before regulation 
is a bad method of governing TNCs because it leads to inconsistent and 
tentative rulings. The rulings are tentative because so much of the pending 
litigation depends on the outcome of other pending cases. For example, 
many of the lawsuits against Uber hinge on whether drivers are classified 
as employees or independent contractors. 
In spite of the adversity TNCs face, they will likely stay market 
leaders. Their innovations cannot be ignored; now that consumers are able 
to utilize a greatly improved transportation service, they are not likely to 
let it go away. 
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